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Aikin and Casey are continuing the development of fallacy theory in two ways
frequently encountered in recent developments: They identify schemes not
recognized before and they argue that some schemes may have instances which are
not fallacious. Thus beside the familiar straw man, they identify the weak man and
the hollow man. They regard these two patterns together with the standard view of
the straw man appeal, which they call the representational view, as all varieties of a
single argumentation scheme. All three, they claim, can have non-fallacious
instances. To establish this, they ask us to consider instances. For the traditional
straw man, they cite the following:
(1) Music teacher to student: you need to work on your intonation. At the
moment it sounds like a tortured cat.

No doubt, the teacher is using exaggeration to make her point, and the traditional
straw man may similarly use exaggeration to distort an argument. No doubt the
teacher’s exaggeration may have positive pedagogical effect. But I am not convinced
that her statement is a non-fallacious instance of the traditional straw man. The
student has not presented an argument through her intonation. By contrast, the
traditional straw man attacks a misrepresentation of an argument.
I am also not convinced that the example to show there are non-fallacious
instances of the weak man appeal makes its point. Brad and Angelina admit that
there are various arguments against gay marriage. One is considered:
(2) If homosexuals are allowed to marry, then nothing would prevent
the proponent of this argument to marry his box turtle.
Now this argument has to be fleshed out, for in itself we have just a conditional
statement. But surely the proponent expects his audience to agree that marrying
one’s box turtle is absurd and to infer from that statement and the conditional that
gay marriage should not be legalized. Now there is nothing fallacious in pointing out
that the conditional is unacceptable. Indeed making that judgment is part of
argument evaluation. But I do not see that Brad or Angelina have inferred that the
ridiculousness of this argument means that all arguments for gay marriage are
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ridiculous. Yet for weak man, the refutation of one bad argument is taken to mean
that all additional arguments or reasons are bad.
Turning to the hollow man argument, remember that to use this appeal, “one
invents an entirely fictitious and decisively silly position, attributes it to a
purportedly real but vaguely defined opponent, knocks it down, and therefore
suggests the opposition isn’t worthy of rational discussion.” Aikin and Casey point
out that introductory logic texts are full of examples of arguments so fallacious as to
be silly. But it is not obvious that these examples are put forward to suggest that
some opposition is not worthy of serious consideration. Indeed, they are put
forward to illustrate a pattern of bad reasoning and to facilitate its recognition. But
then how are these textbook examples instances of the hollow man appeal? Aikin
and Casey have built discrediting the opposition into the very definition of the
pattern for which they are intending to present non-fallacious instances through
indicating textbook examples of fallacies.
After discussing three varieties of the straw man appeal, Aikin and Casey
turn to iron man arguments, which they regard as a related class. Such arguments
involve “a charitable distortion to present an unserious arguer as serious.” Here
again, I have trouble seeing how their examples fit this definition. In the first, Leslie
Stahl has asked Eric Cantor to explain how Reagan’s raising taxes is compatible with
the current Republican view never to raise taxes. Cantor has replied that Reagan
never raised taxes and his spokesperson claimed that Stahl did not have her facts
right. The blogger Jim Hoft points out that the overall tax rate went down during
Reagan’s presidency. How does this show that either Cantor or his spokesperson
were unserious and Hoft was trying to portray then as serious? Cantor and his
spokesperson may have been factually incorrect, but how does Holft’s presenting
facts which will put Reagan’s tax cuts in a very different light rehabilitate them as
serious? In the Westboro Baptist Church example, how does Priscilla’s suggestion
that these extremists may nonetheless have a legitimate point distort their position
or relieve us of not having to discuss their particular arguments or evaluate their
egregious behavior? In the case of Philosophy Student I, how does a professor’s
suggesting the student’s view makes a suggestion which he may not have intended
but which could improve his argument if developed distort the student’s view to
make him seem a serious arguer when he was not serious? With Philosophy Student
II, no reply by the professor is reported. So how has there been distortion of any off
the wall view to make the student seem serious?
If the instructor took Philosophy student II’s view seriously and spent much
time with it, the instructor might not be making good use of class time. In that case,
“iron manning” would have unwarranted practical consequences. If someone added
a point which might improve our view of one participant’s discussion and tend to
make us suspicious of another’s position, is that necessarily a bad thing? Does that
necessarily mean taking a view over-seriously? If trolls are uninformed and
contribute with “unhinged criticism,” it may be wise not to take them seriously, not
to feed the trolls. But except possibly with Philosophy student II, where there is no
reply, I do not see that these examples of iron manning involve feeding the trolls.
One can certainly agree with Aikin and Casey’s final summation that “sometimes
feeding the trolls is (a) a waste of time and energy, and (b) it ultimately isn’t
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anything but bad for the way we argue,” but I do not see that their examples
illustrate feeding trolls. More seriously, how have they shown that iron manning
invites argumentation which fails to have acceptable premises or adequate, i.e.
relevant and sufficiently strong, connections between premises and the conclusion?
But perhaps these are the wrong questions to ask. If iron man arguments involve the
mistake of including arguments deserving exclusion, as Aikin and Casey conclude,
does not the problem then constitute not a logical but rather a dialectical fallacy?
This opens up a whole new question for Aikin and Casey’s investigation: How do the
fallacious instances of straw man, weak man, hollow man, and iron man violate
dialectical rules, e.g. pragma-dialectical rules, of procedure in argumentative
situations? I commend this question to them.
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